Wamu WKN 893906 really News !

Ja, aber Bopfan liebt auch Commons und nur Commons.
Bopfan kommt auf 56 B $, warten wir die 2 WEEKS ab!!!   OKAY !!!  

Vorgeschichte:
Im März 2008 hat JPMorgan ein Übernahmeangebot in Höhe von 8$ pro Stammaktie angeboten (nach verschiedenen meldungen deutlich unter 8$)
WMI hat dieses Angebot aber als zu niedrig abgelehnt! D.h., JPM war schon einmal bereit diesen Betrag mindestens zu investieren. Also ist die ausgehende Annahme dieses Wertes schon einmal sichere untere Grenze.

auf basis des angebots von jpm im märz 08: jpm hat geboten:

+ 6375 mio (850 mio aktien x 7,5 dollar) (es heisst, deutlich unter 8 , damit sollte es über 7,5 liegen, sonst hätte es deutlich über 7 heissen müssen)

plus die übernahme von schulden:

+ 3400 mio für die vorzüge
+ 13100 mio für die bankbonds
+ 6800 mio für die holdingbonds
+1400 sonstiger schulden

ergibt 31075 mio an totalen kosten für jpm

im september 08 hat jpm wmb für nur 1888 mio, ohne die meisten schulden, und wmb hatte zusätzlich

+ 7200 mio kapitalzufuhr von TPG
+ 4000 mio gewinn aus den cayman trust vorzugsaktien, die bei wmi hängen, ohne die sicherheiten
+ 6400 mio (in den quartalen 2 und 3 von 08 hatte wmb + 14800 rücklagen für schlechte kredite gebildet, damit hatten sie verluste in diesen quartalen, da diese summe voll zu jpm ging, habe ich die verluste auch gegenverrechnet mit ? 7800 verluste aus den quartalen 2 und 3, und dazu die - 600 mio an schlechten kredite (laut den angaben von jpm bei bloombergs)

ergibt insgesamt + 48.675 mio



+ 48675 mio einsparung gegenüber dem kaufangebot vom märz 08
- 1888 mio der "kaufpreis" von jpm an fdic

das bedeutet, jpm hat gegenüber ihrem billigangebot von 3/08

+ 46787 mio profitiert, oder 46,8 mrd dollar.

Noch mal, das ist nicht der wert von wmi, der dürfte bei einer annahme von 15 ? 20 dollar für die stammaktie zwischen  52 und 57 mrd gelegen haben.
Und bei einer ordentlichen versteigerung kann man da wahrscheinlich noch mal 10 ? 20 % dazurechnen.
Vor allem, wenn man berücksichtigt, dass wmi zu der zeit schon ein jahr unter den kriminellen attacken von short sellern zu leiden hatte (und den attacken der marta rechstanwälte, wobei ich hoffe, das man diesen gaunern noch das handwerk legt, grins)

danke an union für die textteile, und die illegalen gewinne von jpm kommen in teil 2, etwas später (oder morgen, grins)  

diese Würstchenbude hat fertich,ein für alle mal ! Und die,die von anfang an Recht hatten,sollten auch die Möglichkeit bekommen,das letzte wort zu haben,also Plusqam,walte "deines Amtes" !

MFG
Chali  

selbst wenn diese würstchenbude fertich hat....was noch lange nicht fakt ist !

so eine wurst wie euch, braucht hier keiner  

Ich mache heute einmal etwas Kontraproduktives .
Ich werde zu sehr von unseren US Mitstreitern ,rund um Daniel Hoffman,
im Dunkeln gelassen was die Informationen bzw. die Strateie angeht .
Einer der Gründe sind Bordinterne Informationen die an Bobfan gelangt
sind, der andere das Gefühl der Unsicherheit im Hofmanteam,daß deren Vorbereitung
gestört wird .Es soll heute ein Hoffmanfiling anwaltlich vorbereitet auf KCCLC
bzw.Pacer erscheinen . Inhalt mir unbekannt , wie gesagt juristisch korrekt aber
laut der mit vorliegenden Informationen nicht anwaltlich eingereicht. Der Anwalt wird sich also bis zu einem Hearing im Hintergrund halten . Selbst dieses sollte im
Moment nicht gepostet werden,ich denke aber ihr habt ein Anrecht darauf ,
obwohl die Gegenseite hier mitliest,Ihr habt es geschafft die Kriegskasse zu
füllen und ich bitte euch im Moment eure Spenden zurückzuhalten bis wir
definitiv etwas vom Anwalt in Erfahrung gebracht haben bzw. Leistung sehen.
Es ist genug Geld eingegangen um vorerst alles bezahlen zu können. Als haltet
euer Geld im Augenblick noch fest . Tokatci der von einem Teil der UNITED Intl.
Mitgkieder Geld zu Überweisungszwecken überwiesen bekommen hat ,leitet
dieses auch erst weiter wenn wir euch gegenüber die versprochende Transparenz
bieten können . Ihr habt Leistung und Vertrauen erbracht und dieses verlange ich
auch von den Leuten die wir als Gruppe unterstützen.
Wenn ich bezüglich des Anwaltes Informationen habe ,will und werde ich sie euch mitteilen. Was ist geschehen bis jetzt ; die UNITED wurde zu UNITED Intl.
wir unterstützen D.Hoffman finanziel bei den Anwaltskosten , die United Intel.

hat nun ein Postfach (Adresse bekomme ich noch mitgeteil) in den Staaten und eine Domain  reserviert (Hompage in Arbeit) (erste Auszüge des Logos seht ihr in meinem Avatar)  , ein Konto wurde direkt und ausscchließlich für die UI eingerichtet .
Die Gruppe wird gerade legalisiert ,daß wir die Möglichkeit zur Gruppenklage bekommen
,dieses wird nötig bei einer Zivilklage .
Wie gesagt es ist einiges passiert aber Cat,Don und wir auf deutscher Seite werden
mit nicht mehr Infos im Augenblick versorgt als ich hier mitteilen kann .

Ich werde zusammen mit Tokatci und C_P_  persönlich. und mit Argusaugen darauf achten daß die Anstrengungen die wir alle erbracht haben und das Vertrauen,daß ihr
uns geschenkt hab ,und unser Zusammenhalt nur dem einen Zweck dient - unser
Investment  zu sichern und überheblichen Anzugträgern bei ihren Vorgehensweisen
in den Hintern zu treten . Ich möchte die Wahrheit mit Assetliste u. allem drum u.dran.
Und auch nur dafür soll UNSER GELD verwendet werden.

Bin traurig euch nicht mehr bieten zu können , u. Umständen bekomme ich gleich noch mehr Infos aus den Staaten .
Und hoffentlich ist das 3 Hoffmanfiling  eine Bombe.

Bitte versucht diese BM hier im Board zu belassen.

Gruß thegerman  

Re: Susman fallen alle Basen und dann einige... 7 Minuten vor in Uebereinstimmung mit dem Thema Baseball Dies sind einige meiner Lieblings-Teile...

"Hatte statt heilen das Problem mit eine gründliche Untersuchung der Ansprüche, die Examiner
nicht genügend Zeit und gebaut auf Ausforschungsbeweis und eigennützige Aussagen von wahrscheinlich Mitangeklagten als primäre Beweis. Die grundlegende Arbeit notwendig, schätzen diese Ansprüche, und somit beurteilen die Angemessenheit der vorgeschlagenen Siedlung wurde noch nicht getan. Als Ergebnis sollte der Plan nicht bestätigt werden."

[Steee-Rike! 1]

"In ähnlicher Weise erkennt die Examiner ehrlich gesagt, dass er nicht einmal versucht haben, bestimmen
ob die derzeitige und frühere Directors und Officers von WMI und WMB haftbar zu sein könnte die
Estate für Mißmanagement oder anderem Fehlverhalten. Melden Sie sich bei 348. Er beschloss, dieses gesamte weglassen
Bereich von seiner Untersuchung weil er nicht genügend Zeit angesichts "des Ausmaßes der
solche eine Anfrage."Id.He, die diese Entscheidung trotz der Existenz einer Versicherungspolice für
$500 Mio., die potenziell diese Ansprüche abdecken würde. "

[Steee-Rike! 2]

"Während der Woche im September 24th, wann wurden Bieter Zusammenstellung Ihrer
Übermittlungen an die FDIC zu WMB aus der Zwangsverwaltung zu kaufen, hatte die FDIC private
Diskussionen mit JPMC diskutieren die Aufnahme in den Verkauf von Steuergutschriften und die
Trust Preferred Securities Sicherheiten, beide von denen waren im Wert von Milliarden von Dollar
um die erwerbende Bank. Es gibt keine Beweise, die entweder dieser Vermögenswerte war eindeutig
offengelegt, um die anderen Bieter."

[Steeee-Rike! 3] POS/POR's OUT!  

Die TPS Einwand .... WOW!
Gerade wenn man denkt sie über zum Abschluss der Einwand am Ende mit einem Standard-Abschluss .... BAM!

Page 56
$ 700.000.000 über Zinszahlungen an die Anleihe-Inhaber beachten "befreit dich für den" Wasserfall.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229101119000000000071.pdf  

ür die, die nicht wählen durften, eine mustermail:

"Guten Tag Herr Schnabel

Auch ich bin nicht von meiner Bank über die Abstimmung zum POR benachrichtigt worden.
Es wurden mir keine Abstimmungsunterlagen zur Verfügung gestellt .Obwohl ich per email angefragt habe (Beilage A), erhielt ich eine Absage (Beilage B). Ich habe dann noch per Email beim Wahlbeauftragten KCCLLC angefragt (Beilage C), aber keine Antwort bekommen. Somit war ich nicht informiert .
Ich schließe mich somit ihrem Antrag bzw. Antwortschreiben zur Bemängelung dieser Umstände an .

Name: Sxxxxxx Xxxxxxx
Anschrift: xxxxxxxx33 ,4xxxx Bxxxxx

Anzahl der Aktien der einzelnen Positionen zu Zeitpunkt der Abstimmung.
WampQ xxx
WamkQ xxxx
WamuQ xxxxx

Broker (oder Bank): XXXXXXX
Des weiteren zweifele ich die Rechmäßigkeit der Abstimmung an, da  die Stammaktien
durch einen nicht rechtmäßigen POR von der Abstimmung ausgeschloßen wurden.

MFG  
/s/max mustermann

mail an:  Philipp.Schnabel@aktienbase.de

die sätze: "Obwohl ich per email angefragt habe (Beilage A), erhielt ich eine Absage (Beilage B). Ich habe dann noch per Email beim Wahlbeauftragten KCCLLC angefragt (Beilage C), aber keine Antwort bekommen." solltet ihr an eure situation anpassen, z.b. für die, die telefonisch angefragt haben, gebt den namen des ansprechpartners an.

ich finde es wichtig, dass wir darauf hinweisen, dass uns als europäischen aktionären das wahlrecht gestohlen wurde. und, ganz wichtig, es könnte ein klagegrund für uns aktionäre sein.  

---

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229101124000000000003.pdf
 --------------------------------------------------
 
 Claims and Equity Interests are classified as follows:
 Class 1 Priority Non-Tax Claims
 Class 2 Senior Notes Claims
 Class 3 Senior Subordinated Notes Claims
 Class 4 WMI Medical Plan Claims
 Class 5 JPMC Rabbi Trust/Policy Claims
 Class 6 Other Benefit Plan Claims
 Class 7 Qualified Plan Claims
 Class 8 WMB Vendor Claims
 Class 9 Visa Claims
 Class 10 Bond Claims
 Class 11 WMI Vendor Claims
 Class 12 General Unsecured Claims
 Class 13 Convenience Claims
 Class 14 CCB-1 Guarantees Claims
 Class 15 CCB-2 Guarantees Claims
 Class 16 PIERS Claims (Wahuq)
 Class 17A WMB Senior Notes Claims
 Class 17B WMB Subordinated Notes Claims
 Class 18 Subordinated Claims
 Class 19 REIT Series (TruPs, aka caymans)
 Class 20 Preferred Equity Interests (wamkq) + (Wampq)
 Class 21 Dime Warrants
 Class 22 Common Equity Interests (Wamuq)
 
 rot: gegen den Plan
 grün: dafür
 
 --------------------------------------------------

MfG.L:)

1. Angebot von JPM

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/Examiner/...D_000002773.0001.pdf

--------------------------------------------------
2. Gratulation... "Höchsbietender"
http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/Examiner/4401/JPM_EX00036140.PDF

--------------------------------------------------
3. Stabilisierungsvorschlag an die OTS seitens WMI für WAMU am 23.09.08 erstellt / 24.09.08 präsentiert

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/Examiner/...BKEXAM-GS-000255.pdf

MfG.L:)

Aus GB

von Frank 63

in diesem Threat dokumentiert er mit Hlfe der Hochber Unterlagen, dass schon am 12.09.2008 festgestanden hat, dass Bair JPM die WMB zuschanzen wird, noch bevor Lehman "zweckgepleited" wurde.

Also 13 Tage bevor der Deal als in wenigen Stunden entschieden, das Licht der Öffentlichkeit erblicken soll, hatt die FDIC probleme , dass die American Banker diese Entscheidung schon berichten.

Here is an nother highly confidential doc that shows the this news has already leaked to the writer of American Banker - so it was A DONE DEAL. No need for bids from other banks like TD, Wells Fargo ......

Document here to find: (sry i have no clue where it is in examinerdata at Ghost)

http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4434/JPM_EX00029497.PDF

""Banker has it "" from naomi.g.camper@jpmchase.com at 09/12/2008

and

"" U are buying wamu"" from Rob.Blackwell@sourcemedia.com at 09/12/2008

Actual thread on Yahoo regarding this :

JPM knew on 9/12/08 (and earlier) that they were buying WMB  

http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_%28A_to_Z%29/Stocks_W/threadview?m=me&bn=86316&tid=616111&mid=616111&tof=4&frt=2#616111

Before Lehman is shocking - i do not say that Lehman could have been a trigger for the great theft as we are not in 8-ball, but i can't deny to say i am thinking about this ... and not for the first time . Lehman went bk at 09/15/2008 - so how could they know before this date, that they will buy wamu. And waiting to finish the "done deal" after all the occuring of other bk´s of financial institutions .... brings wamu the status of "just an nother failed bank". At that time with that high stress level no one will suppose about already done preparations long before from jpm/fdic side and no one should know - so the "white knight jpm" is remaining and preserving his backing from government, media and so on.....

Frank

Desweiteren die hochinteressante Diskussion mit El Huez (Richter) hierzu:

El Huez:

Wow!  Great find, Frank.

What we always suspected:  On September 12th, before the Lehman collapse (the publicly alleged proximate cause of the crisis, which was nudged along by JPM) and before the "run on the bank" (again, the publicly alleged immediate cause of the seizure, which was also nudged along by JPM), American Banker Magazine already had the information of the impending seizure and the sale to JPM.  Notice that the JPM employee, Naomi Camper doesn't denied it, but instead immediately notifies JPM in-house counsel, that "Banker has it."  So she knew it was true already, too, and immediately called the lawyer, whose response is redacted as "privileged".

Daniel P. Cooney = General Counsel, Retail Financial Services (Chicago Office)  [Google him.]
Naomi Camper = Co-Head of Federal Government Relations [See http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=165320 for the 2005 press release about her hiring.  Check out all her Washington connections.  Google her, too, and you can also see all the lavish political contributions she can afford to make.]
Rob Blackwell = Washington Bureau Chief, American Banker

To summarize the email time line:

9:44 AST:  Blackwell to Camper:  "Please call. Is important.  Thanks."
9:47 AST:  Camper to Blackwell:  "I cant get off this call for about 15 or 20 minutes Whats going on"
9:49 AST:  Blackwell to Camper:  "U are buying wamu"
9:51 AST:  Camper to Cooney:  "Banker has it"  [note the email was received by Cooney in Chicago timed at 8:51 Central time]
9:57 AST:  Conney to Camper:  "Privileged Material Redacted" (appears to be a lengthy email)

Frank:

El Juez, your hint "" On September 12th, before the Lehman collapse (the publicly alleged proximate cause of the crisis, which was nudged along by JPM) and before "the run on the bank...."" is so important.

One of the main reasons for the Fdic was to seize the bank cause there has been a bank run.
Well.......How will they explain that? Did they talk with OTS/Reich about this at that time too ?

There was no bank run at 09/12/2008 at wamu. There was not even 1 failed bank/financial institution at that time!

So where did all the preparations base on for the already decided seizure of wamu, and who decided and when ?  
Remember the 09/12/2008 is the earliest date we know now from this docs, that the Fdic was already in the boat.
Jpm wants it much earlier - we know. But since when it was also for the Fdic a "done deal" already?
A place on the "no short list" could have been very obstuktive to the whole operation. Paulsons remark with " you should have sold wamu and u you should do so now... the things can get much more worse" - how does this fit in this?

Al Juez:

In case you're interested but didn't check the above link to Naomi Camper, it reads in part as follows:

"New York, June 7, 2005 - JPMorgan Chase announced today that Naomi Gendler Camper will join the firm as co-head of Federal Government Relations. Ms. Camper will work alongside Stephen Ruhlen in Washington, D.C. and report to Rick Lazio, Executive Vice President of Global Government Relations and Public Policy.

"Ms. Camper was most recently the banking and tax aide of Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD), who is on the Senate Banking Committee. In her role as Democratic Staff Director on the Financial Institutions Subcommittee, Ms. Camper worked on financial legislation such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act reauthorization, Sarbanes-Oxley and reform bills related to bankruptcy and federal deposit insurance.

"'We are very pleased that Naomi will be joining us,' said Rick Lazio. 'Her extensive congressional experience combined with her in-depth knowledge of financial issues make her an ideal addition to our Federal team.'

"Prior to working with Senator Johnson, Ms. Camper was assistant counsel at the Investment Company Institute from 1999 to 2001, where she advised mutual fund companies on tax-related legislation and regulations. From 1997 to 1999, she worked in taxation at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, advising corporate clients on tax implications of financial transactions.

"Ms. Camper graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. in Comparative Religion from Columbia University. She also holds a Master in Public Policy from Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a J.D. from Harvard Law School."

So, she is not just some mid-level manager or company hack.  With her educational and experiential background she would be right in the middle of JPM's schemes, with direct access to FDIC and other policymakers, and even joined JPM in 2005 at about the time Project West was initiated.

Edit:  Searching her on Google, it appears she is now Manager and (sole) Head of Federal Government Relations, and is listed as a "Vice President" in some data bases. She was Staff Director for Senator Johnson on the Senate Financial Institutions Subcommittee.  See http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2010/01/08/repost-next-banking-committee-chair-has-ties-to-financial-sector

 

 

Ein weiteres Post von Frank 63 auf GB

 Hier werden die Hintergründe zu Judge Hoyt, bei ihm waren die Klagen der ANICO (Texasklage) anhängig die zur ersten Discovery geführt hat, bevor er durch eine plözliche Gerichtsreorganisation den Fall verlor, und wie er über Heath Tarbert mit Weil&Gotshal zusammen hängt.

Jener Heath Tarbert war sozusagen Hoyt's Colaborateur als einer der wesentlichen Manager, im Regierungsauftrag ,der Financial Crisis von 2008 als z.B. am 18.Sept. innerhalb ca. 1Std 550 Mrd aus dem Finanzsystem in US verschwunden waren. Übrigens ist Heath Tarbert Zögling von Sullivan &Cromwell, einer JPM-Vertretung in unserem Fall. Inzwischen ist er der   Sozietät Weil&Gotshal beigetreten.

 

http://ghostofwamu.com/forum/index.php?topic=9277.0

 FDIC $250K Deposit Insurance - 9/18/08

The FED, US Treasury and Whitehouse - Knew 9/18/08 FDIC Insurance Could be Raised to $250K

http://www.law.upenn.edu/alumni/alumnijournal/spring2009/feature1/page02.html

Behind the Bailout Plan

By Will BunchWarren Buffett calls the current travails our economic Pearl Harbor. Does that mean, Sept. 18, the date on which the economy nearly collapsed, was D-Day, as in default?

When he looks back over his tumultuous two years inside the epicenter of America’s financial crisis, the one moment that really stands out for Robert Hoyt, L’89, G’89 — the top lawyer in the U.S. Treasury Department at the end of the Bush administration — is the moment that it almost all fell apart.

It was the afternoon of Sept. 29, 2008. After a long string of 14-hour days, Hoyt and his key Treasury colleagues were up on Capitol Hill to answer last-minute questions from lawmakers on an emergency $700 billion rescue package aimed at resolving a credit crunch that was crippling the U.S. capital markets.

With that task completed, they wandered over to the gallery of the House of Representatives to witness the final vote, which was expected to result in narrow passage because leaders of both parties were on board. Instead, the measure was defeated by a 228-205 margin, as the Bush administration aides watched in stunned silence.

“It was almost an out-of-body experience,” says Hoyt, reliving the ordeal in a January interview as he was preparing to clear out his office for the incoming Obama administration. “Our legislative folks who were there expected that the floor manager would do something to bring it back — and slowly it dawned on us that they couldn’t fix it. Finally, I came back to my office — to watch the stock market plummet. It was disheartening.”

That unhappy ending didn’t stick. The House came back later that week to approve the revised Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, the Bush administration’s response to the near-collapse of the economic system brought on by U.S. financial institutions making massive bad investments in mortgage-backed securities. But the real last chapter of the saga — of whether Bush’s massive intervention in the U.S. economy was able to avert an economic slowdown on the scale of the Great Depression — hasn’t been written.

Two Penn Law alumni found themselves at the heart of the story, in key fiscal policy positions as the presidency of George W. Bush wound down. In fact, Hoyt found he was working closely with Heath Tarbert, L’01, GRL ’02, who went to work in the White House legal counsel’s office in the summer of 2008 and, in a twist of fate, was assigned the portfolio for economic policy. For both Hoyt and Tarbert, their final days in an outgoing GOP administration were a blur of overlapping crises, from the fall of the Lehman Brothers investment firm to stabilizing the banking system to averting the bankruptcy of major automakers.

The irony of all this is that massive interventions seemed to be almost a complete reversal of the first seven years of Bush administration policy, in which the overriding philosophy was to cut taxes and promote a free market economy with minimum government regulation. But both Hoyt and Tarbert, in separate interviews, defended the intervention in the financial markets as the only possible answer, because doing nothing would have guaranteed a wide-reaching collapse of the U.S. economy.

“People were hesitant in a Republican administration to intervene,” notes Tarbert, who had just wrapped up a prestigious law clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas when he took the White House job. “But economists on both sides of the aisle also agreed that if there was ever a time to act, that time was now.”

One of the scariest times for the administration officials came on Sept. 18, after news reports that the collapse of Lehman Brothers meant potential losses for investors in a money-market account that was heavily invested in Lehman commercial paper. The report led to a speedy withdrawal of $550 billion from similar accounts in just an hour or two, and government officials at Treasury and elsewhere worried that some $5.5 trillion could be pulled out by day’s end, which could crash the entire financial system.

“That was an important day — it was like there was something in the system that could have slipped beyond the point of no return,” Tarbert recalled months later. He said the main players — Treasury, the White House, and later the Federal Reserve — determined there was authority under a fairly obscure piece of Depression-era legislation, which created the Exchange Stabilization Fund, to act quickly to pump $50 billion into the system and stabilize it while guaranteeing deposits up to $250,000. It was that crisis, Tarbert explained, that really brought home the need for the larger bailout, or TARP, legislation.

From the beginning, the complexity of the global financial crisis created considerable legal work for the likes of Hoyt, who became the top attorney at Treasury in December 2006 after a stint in the White House counsel’s office. Hoyt oversaw a team of some 2,000 lawyers that advised the department on everything from tax policies to tracing the financing of terrorists. But it would be the crisis in the credit markets that took up the bulk of his time after the summer of 2007, when the market for sub-prime mortgages began to collapse.

“From the beginning, Treasury shifted gears immediately, to start using its tools to devise solutions to the problems in the credit market,” Hoyt says. “One big area was determining what authorities and powers that we had — both as a general matter and to handle the different crises as they came up.” The result was that the Bush administration developed different responses to the complex events. In March 2008, the Federal Reserve, with Treasury’s backing, engineered a $29 billion loan that prevented the collapse of brokerage house Bear Stearns, but the government did not intervene as rival Lehman Brothers went under that September.

“We just didn’t have the tools to fix everything,” Hoyt says of the consequential decision to allow Lehman to fail. “There was a big difference between Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns in that we had a buyer for Bear (JP Morgan Chase). The government needed to support that transaction with lending, because essentially they needed a bridge, while with Lehman there was no transaction to bridge. No one was willing to buy the company.”

Nevertheless, Lehman was the most serious in a row of cascading dominoes — including federal help for the quasipublic mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Then, in November, Hoyt’s team had to pull an all-nighter to finalize a $306 billion asset guarantee for Citigroup.

By then, Hoyt found that he was working at times with Tarbert, who knew that his job as an associate White House counsel would be a short-term position but had no idea he’d find himself at the cutting edge of American financial history. Tarbert said in a January interview that every incoming White House lawyer is assigned a policy area, and because he had worked for a time for the Wall Street-based law firm Sullivan and Cromwell he was assigned the financial-sector portfolio. Colleagues told him that portfolio was “relatively quiet.”

Instead, Tarbert found himself involved in the drafting of critical legislation, especially the bailout package that became known as TARP. “We knew that the economic financial sector was in great turmoil and we were very much concerned about banks failing and causing a catastrophic effect that could have had the entire banking system collapse.” Like Hoyt, he said that worry overrode whatever concerns a conservative administration might have felt over a massive economic intervention. “Nobody knew what was in the black box” of bad loans that were held by the major banks, and he says everyone wanted to avoid the worst possible outcome.

Tarbert notes that Treasury and the Federal Reserve managed to administer the initial rescues of banks and insurance giant AIG. But administration officials realized that they would need congressional approval for a more sweeping plan. However, it proved difficult to develop a program that would stabilize banks and lay the necessary foundation for them to resume lending money to businesses and consumers.

Did it make more sense for Treasury to actually purchase the toxic mortgage-backed assets of the banks and take them off of their books, or should the government quickly inject new capital by buying equity stakes in the troubled institutions? Ultimately, the administration spent most of the initial $350 billion of the program on the second idea, and the results have been controversial. Critics say that the cash flow didn’t convince the banks it was safe to make risky loans during a deep recession even as some banks continued to pay large bonuses to their top executives. Hoyt counters that the rapid infusion of capital stabilized a banking system that was on the verge of collapse — a necessary precondition to programs that would follow, aimed at unfreezing the credit markets.

Hoyt says he believes that while the root causes of the economic crisis will be debated for years to come, history will agree that the Bush administration was correct to intervene on the scale and at the time that it did. He also says he was disappointed by the widespread criticism that the TARP program lacks transparency. Hoyt notes that Treasury has publicly documented every dollar spent, and that the real problem is that banks are unable to trace accurately how they spent the government’s money, as opposed to money they have from other sources.

The transition to the Obama administration complicated matters. On some key issues, including the near-bankruptcy threat of automakers General Motors and Chrysler, Bush officials decided, after consulting with the Obama transition team, to offer short-term aid that handed off to the incoming president the more difficult longer-term political decisions about the government’s role in the car business.

Now, a new Obama administration is in office with a dual focus. It must figure out how to better use the remaining $350 million in bailout money for the financial sector and also administer the $787 billion economic stimulus program that aims to stanch job loss.

Penn’s Michael Knoll, the Theodore K. Warner Professor of Law & Professor of Real Estate, said Obama faces an additional challenge in reversing Bush economic policy: how to address calls for increased government regulation of banks and other financial institutions. “It’s easy to be ideologically opposed to regulation and say you don’t like it, whatever it looks like, but it’s harder to describe a one-size fits all philosophy of imposing regulations, so the politics are a little unclear here,” he says.

But David Abrams, assistant professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy at Penn Law, worries about the impact of bailout decisions already made. He says officials were too quick to eliminate moral hazard in order to prevent investors who make bad decisions from losing their money. “If the feds rescue every bank that screws up,” he adds, “there’s no incentive not to screw up.”

He says he does not envy the mission facing Obama’s economic team. “These are very difficult problems.” His colleague Knoll said the severity of the recession has placed worries about the deficit on the back burner. He said the important thing about stimulus money “is getting folks to spend it.”

“In the Keynes model, it didn’t really matter what the money is for, ‘bridges to nowhere’ are fine... Getting people to work, even if they’re doing nothing, will get things moving again.”

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1.  Where is Heath Tarbert, who holds this valuable information?

Former Senate Banking Committee Special Counsel Heath Tarbert Joins Weil
Weil Broadens Its Financial Regulatory and Beltway Presence(April 22, 2010, Weil Gotshal News)

http://www.weil.com/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=38927


Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP has announced that Heath Tarbert has joined the firm’s Corporate Department as counsel.  He will practice out of the Washington, DC office. Mr. Tarbert comes to Weil from the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, where he served as Special Counsel. Mr. Tarbert was a lead expert and negotiator on the effort to enact comprehensive financial reform legislation with particular focus on the prudential regulation of banks, thrifts, non-bank financial institutions and their holding companies, as well as measures aimed at the reduction of systemic risk in the U.S. financial system.

“Heath has made an invaluable contribution to the Committee’s work on financial regulatory reform," Ranking Member Richard Shelby commented, “his expertise and dedication will be sorely missed.  I am grateful for his service and wish him all the best as he takes on a new challenge.”

“Heath was very collegial and constructive in working with our side of the aisle,” Amy Friend, Chief Counsel for Chairman Christopher Dodd, added, “we will miss him and wish him well in his new ventures.”

From August 2008 to January 2009, Mr. Tarbert served as Associate Counsel to the President of the United States and was responsible for legal issues relating to the financial markets. He was also designated counsel to the National Economic Council and the Council of Economic Advisers, serving as the White House legal liaison to the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The timing of Mr. Tarbert’s service to the White House thrust him into the center of legal decision-making during the financial crisis that intensified after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings in September 2008.

“We are very pleased to have Heath on board,” added Michael Lyle, managing partner of the firm’s Washington office, “he brings an extraordinary knowledge of the current regulatory landscape and will be a vital resource for our financial industry clients –  including banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms – as that landscape evolves.”

Mr. Tarbert’s arrival at Weil marks the third time in just over twelve months that the firm’s Washington office has landed a top name from government. Former Deputy Counsel to the President and federal prosecutor William A. Burck joined the firm early in 2009. Earlier this year, Steven Tyrrell, former Chief of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Fraud Section joined Weil.

Mr. Tarbert began his career as an associate at a large New York-based law firm {insert,  Sullivan Cromwell} before leaving private practice to serve as a law clerk to Chief Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Mr. Tarbert later served as a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court of the United States. He also practiced law as an Attorney-Adviser in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel and recently served as Vice President and Deputy Director of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization dedicated to improving the regulation of U.S. capital markets.

Kudos send to observer for his great DD again.

 

 

jetzt hier: http://www.ariva.de/forum/WMI-Holdings-Corp-News-461347