Boeing im Sturzflug

Boeing Sued by Plane Lessor to Void Contract for 22 Max Jets

sehr interessant wie Boeing mit den Kunden umgeht...
die bestellen sicher nie wiederr eine Boeing...

As of Tuesday, Boeing was supposed to have delivered four of the 737 Max jets to Timaero, but has delivered only two, the Irish company said. Boeing has refused to refund Timaero?s advance payments on the planes, according to the lawsuit.

A spokesman for Boeing, Paul Bergman, declined to comment on the lawsuit.

Read More: Boeing Halts 737 Max Output to Sav  

23.During  development  of  the  737  MAX  in  2012,  wind  tunnel  tests  exposed  the  tendency of the 737 MAX to pitch up during extreme flight conditions, which could impact the pilot?s control of the aircraft. Boeing engineers tried and failed to develop a physical, aerodynamic solution to the problem. ....  

32.Boeing determined MCAS failure during regular flight to be a major event, though in  extreme,  unlikely  flight  conditions,  MCAS  failure  could  be  hazardous  (not  catastrophic).Boeing?s failure analysis did not consider the effect of multiple actuations of the MCAS. Boeing?s analysis also assumed   that pilots will react quickly and properly if failure arose. Boeing knew or should have known MCAS failure should have been categorized as catastrophic.

Muilenburg should be charged for murder, my opinion  

Boeing Changed the Design of the MCAS During Development and Failed to Inform the FAA  

33.By 2015, development of the 737 MAX was behind that of the Airbus A320neo. To  keep  from  losing  market  share,  Boeing  needed  its  new  737  MAX  flight-certified  quickly.  However, the 737 MAX was not well received following test flights in 2016. Test pilots identified the same pitch problems that led to the development of MCAS, but this time at low-speed flight.  

34.Boeing  decided  to  expand  the  use  of  MCAS  to  lower-speed  situations,  including  during  takeoff.  Boeing  also allowed  the  tail  stabilizer  to  move  up  to  2.5  degrees  in  10  seconds,  over 4 times faster than previous design. This allowed the MCAS to work at lower speeds where additional movement horizontal  stabilizer  is required to  steer.  Maximum  nose  down  of  the  Case: 1:19-cv-08234 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/17/19 Page 8 of 32 PageID #:1
9 horizontal stabilizer could now be achieved in only two iterations of MCAS activation.

 

35.Boeing also removed the G-force threshold for activating MCAS, causing it to be triggered by only a single angle of attack sensor. Despite these choices, Boeing chose to retain the failure assessment categorized as major, and did not add any redundancy.36.Boeing  did  not  perform  an  additional  safety  analysis,  or  inform  the  FAA  of  its  changes  to  the  MCAS  design. Boeing  never  informed  the  FAA  of  the  expansion  of  MCAS?  authority in low-speed situations. Boeing also did not inform the FAA that MCAS? control was expanded to move the tail stabilizer from 0.6 to 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds, that the MCAS could be triggered successively, or that MCAS would be triggered by only a single angle of attack sensor.  

37.Boeing knew of the fatal flaws of its MCAS.  In 2016, the chief technical pilot for the 737 MAX told a colleague in a text that MCAS was ?running rampant? and was ?egregious? in a simulator.8 A June 2018 Boeing document stated that if a pilot took more than ten seconds to react to mistaken MCAS activation, the result could be ?catastrophic.?  

38.Boeing  also  chose  not  to  notify  pilots  that  the  MCAS  was  operating  on  the  737 MAX.  Boeing chose  not  to  describe the  MCAS  in  the  flight  crew  operations  manual  (FCOM),  which is the master description of the aircraft for pilots.  

69.Boeing downplayed the MCAS? significant problems and failed to take adequate preventative measures. Boeing also failed to inform the public and customers,  such as Timaero,  of the  danger  MCAS  presented.  Boeing  further failed  to  adequately  disclose  the  significant  differences between the 737 MAX and its predecessors.    

71.Even following the two crashes, Boeing continued to fail to take appropriate action as it was concerned with the economic impact to its business. Boeing was concerned airlines would ground aircraft,  cancel orders, or purchase new aircraft from its rival Airbus. Boeing deliberately downplayed the unsafe nature of its defective aircraft, and falsely lured the public into believe the 737 MAX was airworthy and safe.  

sagen. Das war der Held vom Hudson river, dieser Mann weiss wovon er spricht...

82.In  June  2019, Congress  held  an  evidentiary  hearing  and  heard  from  Chelsey Sullenberger,  the  pilot  who  saved  a  damaged  aircraft  by safely landing  in  the  Hudson  River  in  2009, stated that he struggled in a 737 MAX simulator after the crashes and concluded that MCAS ?was fatally flawed and should never have been approved.?

 

85.In  December  2019,  Ed  Pierson,  a  retired  Boeing  manager,  testified  that  Boeing  executives, its board and U.S. regulators ignored his warnings about the potential for production issues  to  affect  the  quality  and  safety  of  planes  rolling  off  the  lines.Mr.  Pierson  testified  about  how  Boeing?s  efforts  to  up  production  led  to  a  ?chaotic?  environment  that  negatively  impacted  safety. He stated: ?It is alarming that these sensors failed on multiple flights mere months after the airplanes  were  manufactured.?FAA  chief  Steve  Dickson  testified  that  he  was  aware  of  Mr.  Pierson?s concerns.  

90.Following the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, the public has lost complete confidence in the safety of the 737 MAX. 91.Flyers say they will avoid the 737 MAX even if it is cleared for flight because they are now terrified of flying on it.21  

93.Boeing?s  inability  to  solve  design  defects  in  the  737 MAX has  caused  cancelled  flights and kept aircraft grounded.  

94.Jon Weaks, who heads the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA), said in a note to pilots  in November that ?Boeing is increasingly publicizing that they may have to shut down their production line due to running out of room to store completed MAX aircraft. There is some concern that this is simply another tactic to push the [return to service] timeline up.?23 He continued: ?Boeing will never, and should not ever, be given the benefit of the doubt again. The  combination  of  arrogance,  ignorance,  and  greed  should  and  will  haunt  Boeing  for  eternity.  I  strongly concur with Southwest exploring obtaining a different and perhaps non-Boeing aircraft for the best interest of all our futures.?  

95.Even flight attendants have stated they will refuse to work on the 737 MAX when it is recertified by the FAA. Association of Professional Flight Attendants President Lori Bassani wrote in a October 30 letter to Boeing that ?[t]he 28,000 flight attendants working for American Airlines refuse to walk onto a plane that may not be safe and are calling for the highest possible safety standards to avoid another tragedy.?25 Ms. Bassani has also stated: ?I will tell you that I hear from flight attendants every day, and they?re begging me not to make them go back up in [the 737  

 

Gefahr sie sich begeben... Piloten und Besatzung wissen es sehr wohl und keiner wird mehr einsteigen.
Das sollte auch dem CEO einer airline klar sein...

Wen wundert es dass es keine Bestellungen mehr von der 737max gibt...

Boeing is riding a dead horse und merkt es nicht....

alles klar

 

Even flight attendants have stated they will refuse to work on the 737 MAX when it is recertified by the FAA. Association of Professional Flight Attendants President Lori Bassani wrote in a October 30 letter to Boeing that ?[t]he 28,000 flight attendants working for American Airlines refuse to walk onto a plane that may not be safe and are calling for the highest possible safety standards to avoid another tragedy.?25 Ms. Bassani has also stated: ?I will tell you that I hear from flight attendants every day, and they?re begging me not to make them go back up in [the 737  

 

tiefer kann man nicht mehr sinken.

Und ich bin mir hundert Prozent sicher, dass im 737max Skandal demnächst der Name Trump fällt.
Das alles fällt voll in den Beginn seiner Amtszeit und 2016 wurde mit alle Mittel die Zulassung erschlichen... Wenn es so ist wird es Trumps Sargnagel für die Wahl im Herbst


Alles klar  

manager auf einmal nur Interims Manager war...
Der schmeisst nach 2 Monaten schon wieder hin ... warum wohl...

wer will denn seinen Kopf für die Firma hinhalten.  

b.Boeing  knew  and/or  should  have  known  that  the  design  of  the  737  MAX  was contrary  to  FAA  regulatory  standards,  including  the  FAA  Airworthiness  Standards, including  but  not  limited  to  14  C.F.R.  §  25.203(a)  Stall  Characteristics,  which  states  ?[i]t  must be possible to produce and to correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of the aileron and rudder controls, up to the time the airplane is stalled. No abnormal nose-up pitching  may  occur.  The  longitudinal  control  force  must  be  positive  up  to  and  throughout the stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover from a stall by normal use of the controls?;  

c.Boeing knew and/or should have known that the MCAS could dangerously force the 737 MAX?s nose down while trying to mitigate the risks of a potential stall of the aircraft,  yet  Boeing  did  not  take  any  action  to  inform  customers,  pilots  or  aviation  authorities of this hazard, which created a likelihood that the 737 MAX would crash and that aviation authorities would be forced to ground the ai rcraft;  

d.In order to market the 737 MAX as a model that would not require pilots to undergo expensive and time-consuming additional simulator training and/or testing to handle the emergencies, Boeing knowingly permitted an unsafe and deficient design of the aircraft, which permanently compromised the safety and reputation of the 737 MAX and misled Case: 1:19-cv-08234 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/17/19 Page 22 of 32 PageID #:1
23 purchasers  and  potential  purchasers,  including  but  not  limited  to  Timaero,  about  the  nature and economics of the aircraft;